If utilities do not become competitive rapidly, they risk losing part of their market to other agents acting in competition, Moving towards competition, the distribution utilitics, LISLIally at government level, must adapt themsclvcs to this new competitive environment. For example, they must unbundle their scrvices, e.g., create a new independent distribution (grid) company. In parallel, utilities must enhance their commc activities since they no longer have a service monopoly.
In the old model, a utility's energy s~ipply was ensured by means of supply contracts signed with the government energy company supplying the corrcsponding region of Brazil. Two coordination groups, organized at the federal level, were responsible for the generation planning (GCPS) and for the operation of the system (GCOI). Inside these groups, planning and opcrational decisions wcrc made with close cooperation among all government companies and utilities.
The new model, however, primes for competition. The rcgulatory framework is establishcd by ANEEL (The Brazilian National Commission for Electrical Energy) and executed by a system operator (ONS). Likewise, the introduction of competition in generation has led to the creation or an energy market (MAE). In order not to expose the utilities and consumers to the volatility of prices that may occur lollowing such a dramatic change, an 8-year transition period has bccii established. During this transition period, utilities will gradually be exposcd to and must adapt themselves to the new competitive environment.
Focusing on this 8-ycar period (IW-2007) of transition from the present cooperative motlcl to the new competitive model, consideration must he given to alternative solutions available to replace the old supply contracts in the energy portfolio o f a distribution utility such as CEB, thc company with the present distribution monopoly in Brasilia, the capital of Brazil. The effects of the ncw policy on open access and retail competition must he studied and an cconomic assessment of all supply production and transmission of cnergy. Generally, they sell their production to local utilities. However, depending on the supply voltage (i.e., 230 kV and above), they may directly supply large consumers.
At the distribution level, there are many different utilitics whose concession arcas coincide with the administrative boundaries of the local government. Usually, they buy the energy they need to meet the market from the government energy companies. However, many of thcm possess their own hydro generation and, occasionally, thermal power plants.
In this model, the energy market requireincnts are met cooperatively. All of the energy companies benefit from this monopoly. The energy supply and demand of all companies are treated as one and the goal of dispatch is thc overall optimization of the system. Finally, the prices are fixed through a fcdcnil order and do not reflect market forces. The values are bundled, i.e., energy production and transmission costs are not vicwed separatcly.
Competitive Model
The state monopoly and cooperative tnotlel no longer exist. The Brazilian electricity industry is now inoviiig towards a competitive modcl. Without describing this new modcl in detail, some aspects of it are of vital importance in assessing the appropriate actions of a competitive utility in a free market.
Initial Contracls
During the transition period, the ciicrgy supply of the distribution utilities is ensured by special contracts (i.e. Initial Contracts). They guarantee adequatc supply to the cnergy market at present contractual conditions until the year 200 I . That means that the utility will continue to rcccive the energy necessary to supply its market (except for its own generation). I n 2002, the level of 2001 is guaranteed, therefore requiring the utility to look for a new energy supply to meet its market growth. Starling in 2003 the guaranteed amount will be linearly rcduced until 3,006. The difference between the contractual amount and the market requircmcnts of the utility must be provided by either new generation plants, new bilateral contracts or short term purchases on the open market.
Open Access and Transmission Pricing
ANEEL Order 4.59 sets the conditions for open access to the transmission and distribution grids. It also deterinincs the costs to tnove any amount of power over the entire system as well 11s the costs of the associated losses.
Competition in Ketail Sales (Commerciulizalion)
As a consequence of the introduction of competition in commercialization, some consumers (e.g., above 10 MW) are now free to choose their energy retailer. For economic and administrative reasons and the volume of their energy contracts, large consumers are more likely to consider this option. Utilities are aware of this and will take steps to keep their present customers. Moreover, new contracts must take into account the costs associated with the utilization of the distribution grid (i.e., the wire) of the local distribution company.
CEB Case Study
During the transition period, the amounts of energy ensured by the initial contracts with the distribution utilities will he gradually reduced. As a consequence, they must rcplace them with other sources of energy. Considering all the alternatives is a complex matter that depends not only on the available energy sources (present and futurc), but also on the strategy adopted by the utility to supply its energy market.
As part With the open access policy, the cost of moving energy from one point ofthe system to another is unbundled from the cost of energy production. These costs will increase the price of the energy delivered to the utility system and will obviously affect any energy contract. For example, Order 4.59 sets the transmission cost from FURNAS to CEB at $0.79/kW (i.e., $1.69/MWh assuming a 6.5 percent load factor). Now suppose that the Serra da Mesa Hydro Plant ( Figure I ) owner is willing to sell energy to CEB. Assuming the same load factor, the transmission cost from this plant to CEB would be $6.43/MWh. Since CEB now pays about $36.00/MWh for thc energy it buys from FURNAS, the new producer must offer its product at least 19 percent cheaper to become competitive.
The total load of a category of CEB's consumers (i.e., supplied at 88 to 138 kV) is 16.7 MW and 57.1 MW during peak and ol'f-peak hours, respectively. If this load profile repeals every day, its monthly energy consumption will be 37.5 GWh. It is worth noting that this value corresponds to an average power consumption of 52 MW, which represents about 1 I percent of the total average load of CEB (Figure 2) . Based on the tariffs heing used by CEB, these consumers' invoices total $1.67 million per month. If the inarket price of energy is $40/MWh, it would cost CEB $1.50 million to acquire the energy to supply these consumers. In the concession area of CEB, Order 459 fixes the cost of distribution as $2.41/kW per month. Thus, the profit margin for these coiisuiiiers is $170,000, of which $137,000 corresponds to the grid remuneration and $33,000 to connnercialization. Now consider these consumers being supplied by a new retailer. Rased on the energy price and the distribution cost, the new retailer would spend $ I ..5 million for energy and $137,000 for thc grid utilization. Considering that its tariffs might at most equal those ofCEB, the new retailer has only a narrow margin of 2 percent ($33,000) to make an attractive proposal to the consumers.
From this analysis, it is hard to bclicve that a consumer or group of consumers will change suppliers for such a narrow margin. On the other hand, the inarket price of the energy is the major component of coiisunier cost. If the new supplier has access to a cheaper so~irce of energy, it can expand its margin and would be able to propose inore attractive prices to the consuncrs. So the price of energy in the developing free inarket is a key issue in this matter and must he given due attention.
CEB's energy supply alternatives are as follows:
* Initial Contract (IC). As the amounts o f energy ensured by the initial contracts reduce to 7.~1'0, CEB rnay replace them with energy contracted from FUKNAS through bilateral contracts. This alternative is quite attractive, since both FURNAS and CEB will be interested in selling and buying quantities that differ from the initial contract. Itaipu Binational (ITA). The contract with Itaipu will not he affected by the restructuring process, since Itaipu is a Brazil-Paraguay joint project. The study considers the values a s they are presently established in the international contract. 
I
Paranoa Hydro Plant (UPA). This hydro plant has an installed capacity of 30 MW (i.e., 3 x 10 MW) and a firm energy of 13 mean MW. Since it was constructed over 30 years ago, most ofits cost has bccn recovered. Therefore, it produces energy at a low cost (it., $IO/MWh). @ Natural Gas Thermal Plant (GAS). The study considers the construction of a gas pipeline from Campinas (SP) to Brasilia and the installation of a thermal plant with an installed capacity of250 MW and a firm energy of 150 mean MW. If wc consider all the alternatives to supplying the market, it is possible to determine the amounts of energy to be contracted (TBC) by CEB either through bilateral contracts or in the short term markct (Table I and Figure 3) . Figure 3 shows the relative amounts of each supply alternative. It is interesting to note that CEB has a surplus of energy only in 2002 . From 2003 until 2007 , CEB has to contract increasing amounts of cnergy to supply its market.
* Diesel Thermal Plant (UTE

Economic Assessment
In order to dctermine the value of the energy to CEB, simulations have been carried out based on the energy prices of the portfolio composed of the energy suppliers considered above (Table 2) .
At present, it is difficult to make a precise cstimate of thc price at which CEB will buy the energy necessary to cover the deficit expected in the coming years. Therefore, the study was carried out considering three different prices for this energy: $35, $40, and $45 per MWh.
Without the Gas Supplier
Since thc gas alternative still has many uncertainties associated with it (e.g., construction of the gas pipelinc and the gas plant), in the first part of the study the prices of the energy in the portfolio have been dcterinined without considering this supplier available. From an analysis of Figure 4 , one can see that the strategy of CEB in becoming a party of new hydro plant projects limits the variations in price of the CEB energy portfolio to a narrow range, even considering a large variation in the prices of energy in the future contracts.
With the Gas Supplier
In order to determine the influence of the gas supplier alternative, the second part of the study considered the cost of this new supplier in the energy portfolio. Coiisidering the construction of the gas pipeline and the gas plant, the latter will start commercial operation during 2005 (i.e., 75 mean MW) and will reach full operation in 2006 (i.e., 150 mean MW). Preliminary studies estimated that the price of the energy produced by the gas plant will be around $32/MWh and this was the valuc adopted in the study.
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Call for Papers Comparing Table 4 with the corresponding values oCTable 3, one verifies that the values considering the gas supplier are lower. This is quite evident, since part or the energy to be contracted has been supplied by a chcaper energy source. It is worth noting that the gas alternative is even cheaper than the lower price assumed to buy the energy (Figures 4 and 5) .
Conclusions
The Brazilian electricity industry restructuring process has inany important conscquences for the energy market and utilities. Utilities must make a major effort to adapt themselves to this new competitive environmcnt. Retail competition is a kcy issue in this process. If utilities do not become competitive rapidly, they risk losing part ol' their market to other agents acting in this environment.
Although prices still contain a large degree of unccrtainty, strategic decisions must be made right now for the utilities to compose their energy portfolio and to ensure hedging to its prices. In this context, natural gas seems to be an attractive solution, especially if the utility has access to a nearby gas source.
In the case of CEB, simulations of price considering thc strategic decisions already made showed that the prices of energy are limited into a narrow range.
